(P/B) CONVENTIONAL DETERRENCE

Παρουσίαση

"Mearsheimer offers a fine example of how defense policy analysis should be conducted. He demonstrates an excellent grasp of proportion and priority in concentrating on some of the most important yet understudied questions of deterrence and modern warfare. Why, he asks, are offensive strategies accepted or avoided by states facing the prospect of large-scale conventional war? In answering this question, Mearsheimer confronts other questions of politics and perceptions that the strategic nuclear deadlock has only accentuated. The historic and technical details are handled masterfully while lessons are drawn for assessing the pivotal military balance in central Europe. This is a sophisticated yet thoroughly lucid book worthy of careful attention by any student of U.S. national security policy." -Journal of Policy Analysis and Management
"John Mearsheimer has got his timing just right. There is much current talk about the need to do this and do that to bolster NATO's conventional forces, but there is no conceptual framework for assessing all these proposals. . . . This is a carefully argued and well-written study that should immediately raise the quality of the debate. Most importantly, it draws effectively on history to illuminate contemporary problems."-Lawrence Freedman, New Republic
"An intelligent, well-researched and organized study."-Foreign Affairs

Περιεχόμενα

Preface
1 Introduction
2 Conventional Deterrence
3 The Allied Decision Not to Attack Germany, March 1939-May 1940
4 The German Decision to Attack in the West, 1939-1940
5 Conventional Deterrence and the Arab-Israeli Conflict
6 The Prospects for Conventional Deterrence in Central Europe
7 Precision-Guided Munitions and Conventional Deterrence
8 Conclusion
Notes
Select Bibliography
Index